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The Bush Administration's legal performance in the war on terror
was much like its performance in the war in Iraq. In both cases it had
plausible objectives, but employed mistaken, often counterproductive
and occasionally foolish strategy. The Bush Administration itself has
admitted mistakes in Iraq.' But it is also important to describe the
errors in its legal strategy to which it has not yet admitted so that
future administrations will not suffer similar defeats in the courts of
law and the courts of public opinion.
The errors in the Bush Administration's legal strategy had
common roots. One was an ideological focus on bolstering executive
power and a consequent lack of pragmatic flexibility in choosing
tactics that would maximize the chances of gaining public and
judicial acceptance of its framework for detention, interrogation, and
trial of terrorists as well as surveillance of individuals residing in
America. The Administration repeatedly failed to recognize that
reliance on executive authority alone entailed a high risk of defeat at
the hands of the Court.
Second, the Administration underestimated the magnitude of the
risk that the Court would curb the President's discretion, because it
radically misunderstood the changed legal environment for litigation
in the twenty-first century. Every aspect of American life has seen
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increasing legalization 2 and as a result of this trend even discretion in
the war on terror would likely be seen through the prism of legalism
that applies to domestic criminal law. Moreover, foreign elites,
particularly European elites, would seek to influence our judiciary so
as to tie down what they regard as a dangerous hegemon.
The third systematic error was a failure to recognize that all
Administrations tend to lose power as they age, 3 and wars run a high
risk of exacerbating that loss as the conflict proves less popular than
it was at the initial stage. Of course, the scandals at Abu Ghraib4 and
the specific setbacks in Iraq could not have been predicted. But an
Administration's legal high command-and here I speak particularly
of the White House Counsel and Attorney General and not those
simply defending the policies in court-must be particularly mindful
of the general downside risks so as to minimize the worst possible
outcomes.
As a result, the Administration would have been well advised to
take every step to bolster its legal position as early as practicable. It
could have done that by securing from Congress framework
legislation for detention, military tribunals, surveillance, and perhaps
even interrogation. Because citizens are generally most supportive of
an Administration at the beginning of a conflict (a phenomenon so
well know among political scientists that is has been given the name
"rally around the flag effect"5), the terms of trade of the
Administration with Congress would have been likely favorable,
2. For a discussion of several aspects of the increase in American civil litigation, see Marc S.
Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986).
3. Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, The President: Lightning Rod or King?, 115 YALE L. J.
2611 (2006) (arguing that the incumbent president's political party tends to lose power in mid-term and
off-year elections as voters blame the president for national woes).
4. In 2004, reports emerged that American military personnel physically, sexually, and
psychologically abused detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. See Scott Higham and Joe Stephens,
New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge: Abu Ghraib Detainees' Statements Describe Sexual Humiliation
and Savage Beatings, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at AOl. The Taguba Report, the result of the
military's inquiry into events at Abu Ghraib, is available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/
tagubarpt.html.
5. See William D. Baker & John R. Oneal, Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and
Origins of the "Rally 'Round the Flag" Effect, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 661 (2001). See also Matthew A.
Baum, The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon, 46 INT'L STUD. Q. 263
(2002).
[Vol. 25:2
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even when the Senate was controlled briefly by the Democrats in late
2001 and 2002, not to mention in 2003 when Republicans took over
both Houses and the United States was still savoring victory in Iraq.
To be sure, nothing is certain in the legislative process and deals
would have had to have been struck, but it seems very likely the
Administration early on could have obtained legislation that would
have met its strategic objectives.
The consequences of eschewing Congress and relying on
vindication of executive power in court have been grave. Far from
strengthening executive power, the Administration's policies
generated a series of Supreme Court defeats that have weakened it.
6
These losses contributed to a public perception that its policy for
dealing with captured terrorists was in disarray, and still worse, that
the United States was entrenching on liberties as never before, when
the reality is that the war in Iraq and the war on terror has trenched on
liberties less than previous wars and even the detainees at
Guantanamo had greater protections at trial than their counterparts in
earlier wars. 7 The unnecessary reliance on executive power also
permitted foreign critics to claim that President Bush was a lone
ranger in his approach to detention of enemy combatants, whereas
early endorsement by Congress of specific polices would have
underscored the reality that he reflected the consensus of the
American people at the time.
Let me stress at the outset that the Administration's errors were
ones of prudence and judgment, not morality or ethics. After
September 11, the United States was confronted with a new kind of
enemy made all the more fearsome in an age of weapons of mass
destruction. The Bush Administration's lawyers had to confront
novel kinds of questions without a clear legal map. These errors do
not make their service any less patriotic and admirable.
6. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (finding that a United States citizen held as an enemy
combatant had a due process right to contest his detainment); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004)
(holding that district courts could hear habeas claims of Guantanamo Bay detainees); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the military commissions established by the Bush
Administration violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
7. This point is ably made in Jack Goldsmith & Cass Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal
Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMM. 261, 288 (2002).
20081
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 379 2008-2009
)  m   379 
 t     
  
  




    
 
i   '   
  i  f re e Court defeats that have weakened it.6 
   
  
  i     
   
  
    
  r     
   
    t ,  
t   
   
  
'   
   r 
,   
   
'    
   
   
. rn .s. t    
t t ; .  
l i  t t i t i t t  l    l i   t rn   t i ); a  . 
rn    i s   
 nn   i    
. i  i t i  l   i  J  l s it   ss st i , ilit ry ri nals  l 
lt : t  iff  i t   ,  . . ,  ( ). 
3
McGinnis: Losing the Law War:  The Bush Administration's Strategic Errors
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Yet some law professors have unfortunately called the work of
these lawyers incompetent to the point of being unethical.8 Amnesty
International has even suggested that some of the lawyers be
investigated for war crimes.9 The translation of legitimate disputes
about law into matters of ethics and criminal law is an attempt to cut
off the legitimate debate by which law is made in a democratic and
pluralist society. Amnesty International has never provided any
showing that the Administration lawyers' arguments were made in
bad faith or lacked a basis in law, even if they were rejected by some
courts and other scholars. 10
I. GETrING SOME BIG THINGS RIGHT
Before analyzing the Bush Administration's strategy on the war on
terror, it is important to reject some lines of critique made popular by
its opponents. First, critics are wrong to suggest that terrorism only
requires enhanced law enforcement rather than the use of war
powers. Second, critics are also wrong to suggest that the United
States is bound by international law even if that law is not
incorporated into our domestic law.
The 9/11 attack on the United States was an act of war no less than
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Al-Qaeda was a military organization
8. See Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT'L. SEC. L.
& POL'Y 455, 463 (2005) ("The substantive inaccuracies of the Bybee Memorandum are so serious that
they implicate the legal ethics obligations of its authors.").
9. "... Amnesty International calls upon state bar authorities to investigate the Administration
lawyers alleged to be involved in the torture scandal for failing to meet professional responsibility
standards. The attorneys who wrote various legal opinions that may have provided cover for subsequent
crimes and who should be investigated include [former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel Jay] Bybee and David Addington, General Counsel to Vice President Cheney; Robert
Delahunty, former Special Counsel in the Office of Homeland Security, and three attorneys in the Office
of Legal Counsel-John Yoo, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Philbin, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, and Jack Goldsmith, former Assistant Attorney General. We also call on the
Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility to make public the findings of its
investigation into the Bybee memo." Amnesty International USA, Statement of Dr. William F. Schulz
Executive Director, ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport/
statement.html.
10. David McGowan of the University of San Diego has superbly discussed these issues in depth in
his recent article, Decency, Due Care, and Lawyering in the War on Terror,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.c fm?abstractid--975124.
[Vol. 25:2
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that was attempting to harm and disrupt the United States as a nation-
state rather than simply harm individuals. As such, the action against
it cannot be understood within a law enforcement paradigm, because
that paradigm presupposes that the actors are within the bounds of
civil society. Instead, Al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists act in a
world that predates civil society, because between such strangers
there is no common government responsible for law enforcement. Al-
Qaeda and its members are not part of our social compact and thus do
not enjoy the rights that derive from it. Al-Qaeda's lack of
recognition as a nation-state does not make it a part of the social
compact. The Bush Administration is as right to make war on Al-
Qaeda as Thomas Jefferson was on the Barbary pirates of his day.11
Any administration should scrupulously adhere to all constitutional
laws that have been enacted through our carefully wrought
procedures of bicameralism and presentment. International law can,
of course, become binding as well when the President and the Senate
agree to ratify a treaty or when Congress decides to incorporate the
norms of international law into a statute.
But when the critics of the Bush Administration denounced it for
violating international law, they did not confine themselves to
complaints about international rules that have become domestic
obligations. They complain, for instance, that Bush violated a norm
of customary international law in invading Iraq or violated an
interpretation of the United Nations Charter proclaimed by other
nations or international bodies even if the United States has a
different interpretation.' 2 They argue that the United States should
follow interpretations of treaties of international bodies and
committees in its treatment of enemy combatants. 13
11. For a discussion of Jefferson's dealings with the Barbary states, see GERHARD CASPER,
SEPARATING POWER 45-67 (1997).
12. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq & the Future of United States Foreign Policy: Failures of
Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L & COM. 149, 163 (2004).
13. See Peter Jan Honigsberg, Protecting the Nation at the Expense of Individuals? Defining the
Scope of U.S. Executive Power at Home and Abroad in Times of Crisis Chasing "Enemy Combatants'"
and Circumventing International Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 1, 24-25 (2007).
20081
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The Administration has no obligation to follow such norms. First,
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes the
supreme law of the land only treaties and statutes, and only the legal
interpretations of our domestic courts or other institutions designed
by the domestic political branches. 14 But it is more than a formal
error for the United States to consider itself bound by international
law unratified by the political branches. Such "raw" international law
has a large democratic deficit. 15 It does not emerge from any
democratic process but is instead shaped by unrepresentative elites in
the form of international law professors or international jurists who
sometimes hail from authoritarian nations. Democracy has its defects,
but elections and open debate give us the assurance that norms that
our political branches choose are likely superior than those that
emerge from the uncertain process of international law.
Indeed, American law is not only likely better than unratified
international law for Americans because of its democratic
provenance, but in many areas is also likely to aid foreigners.
Because of the position of the United States as the dominant
economic and military power in the international system, it has strong
incentives to provide international public goods, such as appropriate
detention of international terrorists, that benefit foreigners as well as
Americans. Thus, the Administration has not only been doing
Americans a favor when it does not allow international law to
constrain the President's otherwise lawful discretion, it has been
doing a service for citizens around the world.
II. DETENTION
The United States faced three issues in adapting the war paradigm
to hold prisoners of war captured in the war on terror. First, unlike
conventional wars, prisoners taken in the war against Al-Qaeda and
other organizations are generally not in uniform and sometimes do
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
15. See John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 1175, 1193-1224 (2007) (describing in far more detail the huge democratic deficit that besets
international law).
[Vol 25:2
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not in fact proclaim their allegiance to their organizations. 16 Their
uncertain and often opaque identity creates a greater risk that
individuals will be captured in error. Second, the war against Al-
Qaeda does not have as clear a stopping point as conventional wars,
because conventional wars generally can be ended by capturing the
enemy's territory. In particular, because these combatants are part of
an irregular army and cannot be forced by their own domestic law to
persist in fighting, that length of detention may extend long after their
allegiance to the cause has dissipated.
The third difference affecting detention between conventional war
and the war on terror is more general. The Bush Administration
should have realized that it would face a much more concerted legal
effort to release these prisoners than Administrations in previous
conventional wars faced. The precedents limiting the Administration
relied upon were generally from World War II era. 17 Yet since that
time federal courts have constrained government discretion in
running schools 18 and prisons19 and ordered states to raise taxes.20 In
2000, they decided a Presidential election.2 1 It is a short step to
bringing more judicial regulation to war, particularly when that war is
not conventional and may appear more closely related to law
enforcement. Moreover, since that time the world has become
smaller: some of the Justices of the Court have been increasingly
interested in making sure that the Court takes into account a
transnational perspective on constitutional jurisprudence -- one that
garners respect for United States around the world and respect for
themselves in their international networks of peer jurists.
22
16. See PAUL L. WILLIAMS, AL QAEDA: BROTHERHOOD OF TERROR vii-viii (2002).
17. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
18. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007); Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 439 U.S. 1357 (1978); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Shawnee County, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).
20. See Missouri v. Jenkins 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (holding federal courts could require school districts
to levy taxes in excess of limits set by state statute to fund school desegregation plan).
21. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 (2000).
22. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding unconstitutional state laws
allowing the death penalty for juveniles, relying in part on near unanimity of foreign courts against the
death penalty for juveniles). See also Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities 94 VA. L. REV. 1931
(2008) (essay on the propriety of federal courts citing foreign law); Harris Meyer, Justice Kennedy
20081
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In light of these potential problems, the Bush Administration
should have immediately acknowledged the differences that
unconventional wars made to the legal framework for holding
detainees and tempered the anomalies through the generous use of
legal process, with military tribunals providing the initial process.
Because of the legal climate and the possibility that its war effort
would become unpopular and thus more liable to legal attack, it
should also have sought, as soon as practicable, Congress'
endorsement of these legal structures through framework legislation
that would have supplemented the military process with review by
Article III courts under a deferential standard.
Unfortunately, however, the Bush Administration took a grudging
approach to the granting of process and resorted to unilateral
strategies that were easily portrayed as lawyers' tricks. For instance,
at first the Administration argued that it had no obligation to give any
substantial process to determine whether those caught on the
battlefield were in fact enemy combatants, even if they were United
States citizens. This was a mistake even as matter of theory, not to
mention prudence. The key question determining whether the war or
law enforcement paradigm should apply is whether the individual's
action should be judged inside or outside our social compact. A
citizen is within our social compact and should be treated within the
war paradigm only if he has chosen to be an enemy combatant. He
certainly deserves substantial process to challenge his status before
being treated as outside the pale.
Thus, there was a substantial risk that the Court would hold, as it
did in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, that an American citizen had a right to
substantial process to challenge his designation as an enemy
combatant. 23 Indeed, in Hamdi only a single justice, Justice Clarence
Wades Into International Waters Again, DAILY Bus. REV., May 17, 2005, available at:
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1116246912761; Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks at the
Southern Center for International Studies, Oct. 28, 2003, http://www.southemcenter.org/OConnor_
transcript.pdf (stating that legal conclusions reached by the international community, "although not
formally binding upon our decisions, should at times constitute persuasive authority in American
courts.").
23. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
[Vol. 25:2
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Thomas, would have automatically deferred to executive
determination on Hamdi's combatant status.
24
While the Court directly resolved only the question of a United
States citizen's due process rights, the Bush Administration should
have extended this right at the outset to noncitizens as well. By
showing it was scrupulous in taking care not to have incorrectly
detained noncombatants; the Administration could have forestalled
criticism and showed that its regime was not lawless, but carefully
considered. Even more importantly, the more internal process it gave
on such key issues, the less likely the Supreme Court would hold that
individuals had full rights to habeas corpus. Some swing Justices, like
Stephen Breyer, care about preventing errors and are not much
concerned about the rubric under which that error correction
occurred. In Hamdi itself, the Court indicated that the military
tribunals, at least in the first instance, might provide sufficient
process for a challenge to enemy combatant status.
25
For similar reasons, the Administration should have from the
outset publicly provided a process for determining when individuals
were no longer substantial threats or could provide substantial
information. Because members of Al-Qaeda are irregular enemy
combatants, not common criminals, the United States cannot be put
to the choice of trying these detainees and releasing them to the
battlefield to fight again. But their irregular nature makes it less clear
that they will fight again: no territorial power can compel them. A
process for reviewing their dangerousness and information value
might even have given detainees incentives to rethink their
commitment to jihad and consider how they could make concrete
commitments to show that they would not go back to the fight.
Whatever the Administration did, however, lawyers in the United
States were going to file lawsuits on behalf of the prisoners seeking
more and better process and rights indistinguishable from Americans
accused of crimes. The basic response of the Administration to this
prospect was to keep detainees at Guantanamo. Because Guantanamo
24. Id. at 579.
25. Id. at 538.
20081
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 385 2008-2009
)     385 
ti ll    
 a di' s co batant status. 24 
    
'   
   








 i lf,  
 
 ll  to ene y combatant status. 25 
   
  l  
  
 I   
 t  
   
   
l  l  
        
    
   
  
   , ,     
  
  
ti   
t  
[ .   
[ .  . 
9
McGinnis: Losing the Law War:  The Bush Administration's Strategic Errors
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
is not part of the United States and yet controlled by it, these legal
strategists believed it was the perfect place to hold the prisoners more
easily than they could in foreign territory, and yet be immune from
the reach of United States courts. To split metaphysical sovereignty
from control was extremely clever, but it was clearly vulnerable to
attack as a legal fiction. Although the Supreme Court fifty years ago
refused jurisdiction over habeas claims in a case that arose in Allied
occupied Germany, 26 such precedent cannot be relied on to hold up
when translated to a new context in a high profile case like this one.
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush, in which it
insisted on taking jurisdiction of habeas cases at Guantanamo, should
have been seen as a substantial risk.27
It is the Bush Administration's legal strategy that in large measure
has made Guantanamo a symbol of lawless in the Administration's
war on terror. Its creation under these circumstances suggests to the
outside world that the United States was playing legal games rather
than following principles of law. And because the Administration
was making these decisions without legislative input, it could be
portrayed as eccentric and malevolent rather than a faithful agent of
the American people.
Instead of resorting to a legal slight of hand, the Administration
should have gone to Congress to bolster its case. If Congress had
from the beginning endorsed the framework for holding detainees
outlined above, the Court would have been unlikely to disturb this
settlement. The reasons for such deference are both doctrinal and
practical. As a doctrinal matter the Court gives substantial deference
to Congress's weighing of the costs and benefits of various
procedures. In a recent book, Professor Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule suggest that the Court should give this kind of deference in
the cases concerning terrorism to the executive, because the Court's
institutional competence in devising responses to terrorism is much
less than that of the executive. 28 But the executive may not have the
26. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,790-91 (1950).
27. 542 U.S. 466, 478 (2004).
28. ERic POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE (2006).
[Vol. 25:2
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appropriate incentives to make the tradeoff between liberty and
security. It is more likely to discount all liberty interests because of
its recognition that the greatest risks to its political standing come
from a lapse in security, however improbable the cause, rather than
from complaints about liberties foregone.
More importantly from a strategic perspective, whatever degree of
deference the Court should give to the executive as matter of
normative principle, as a matter of realpolitik the Court is much more
reluctant to disturb the judgment of Congress than a decision by the
executive. Such action would fly much more clearly in the face of the
popular will.
Moreover, such a framework statute would have also permitted the
United States to hold these prisoners, as they did German prisoners
and other previous captives, in the United States, thus dispensing
with the negative symbolism of a place that can easily portrayed as a
legal netherworld. It may be argued that the Administration still
needed a jurisdiction outside the territorial United States to make
prisoners' habeas petitions less likely to succeed. The content of
rights protected by habeas, however, have been historically flexible
and context dependent.29 If the courts were satisfied that the prisoners
were getting the amount of process that Congress judged reasonable
for enemy prisoners, they would be unlikely to require substantive
changes.
It might be argued that my view that the Bush administration could
have avoided Court defeats by obtaining congressional enactment of
their polices into law is undermined by the Supreme Court's decision
in Boumediene v. Bush in 2008.30 After judicial defeats, the Bush
Administration had finally gone to Congress to get a framework for
detention of captured terrorists 31 and a framework for military
tribunals to try them. 32 Nevertheless, in Boumediene the Court held
29. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and
the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2095-96 (2007) ("But absent clear statutory guidance,
habeas courts have mostly operated within the Common Law Model, fusing a commitment to the
protection of liberty with a flexible spirit attentive to institutional realities and the balance of equities.").
30. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)
31. Detention Treatment Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 2739.
32. Military Commissions Act of 2006,28 U.S.C.A. 2241.
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the Congress's decision in the Military Commission Act to cut off
review of habeas petitions of those detained was unconstitutional.33
In the course of this holding, it also stated that the legal process,
including review by the appellate court, provided by Congress in the
Detention Act, did not provide a sufficient substitute for the rights of
habeas corpus.
34
In my view, however, this defeat actually confirms that the Bush
Administration made a grave error in failing to have gone to
Congress earlier. One does not have to be strong realist to believe
that the result would likely have been different if the Bush
administration had gotten the same legislation passed in 2001 or early
2002. First, the legal challenge would have arisen when the memory
of 9/11 was very fresh. In contrast, by the time the Court decided the
case in 2008 the nation had not been attacked for almost seven years
and the memory of the threat had receded. Second, an earlier court
challenge of a congressional settlement t would have arisen when
Bush was a relatively popular President, favored for reelection, or
newly reelected. Instead, the challenge to the congressional
framework came when President Bush was the lamest of lame ducks.
Third, if the challenge had come earlier at a time when President
Bush had eschewed reliance solely on his own executive power and
had sought congressional input into and ratification of his policies
before judicial defeat, he would have had reputation for greater
conciliation and moderation. Instead, by the time Boumediene was
heard, he had lost the respect of legal elites, because of extravagant
legal claims such as those embodied in the so-called torture memo
and the resulting adverse publicity. After such events the Supreme
Court was less likely to trust the administration with discretion
vouchsafed by the congressional enactments it belatedly obtained.
Finally, by 2008 the Court had been emboldened by the praise it had
received for previous decisions rejecting unilateral Bush
administration policies. Had the Court faced the same issues in 2003
or even 2005, it would have been less certain of the reception of a
33. Id. at 2240
34. Id.
[VoL 25:2
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decision adverse to an administration backed by Congress and thus
would have faced a very different calculus in deciding whether to
uphold the congressional settlement.
The ready availability of a congressional solution raises the
question of why it was not sought. One rational explanation is that
the Administration thought that using Congress would detract from
its project of using the crisis to bolster executive authority. In
particular, Vice President Cheney, who had seen the decline of
executive authority occasioned by Watergate and Vietnam, spoke out
frequently of the need to restore executive power. 35 This strategy,
however, was imprudent. First, it was not likely to succeed. The
Supreme Court had only two consistent supporters of executive
power-Justices Scalia and Thomas. 36 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who had worked in the Office of Legal Counsel-an office dedicated
to preserving that power, had ruled against the executive in such
important cases as the Independent Counsel Act,37 and had celebrated
the Court's curbing of executive overreaching in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 38
But second, it is a mistake to risk substantial harm to an important
policy to build up precedents for an undefined future eventuality. The
interpretation of executive power has waxed and waned over the
course of American history, dependent largely on Justices' reaction to
the felt necessities of the time and the constellation of political power
in Congress and in the nation. Even had the Bush Administration won
a victory for the executive branch in the context of detention, it
would be distinguished away, if future justices believe that
circumstances warrant.
35. Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen Executive Power,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al.
36. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
38. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT, How IT Is, How IT WAS 94 (1987).
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III. INTERROGATION METHODS
Once again the Administration had serious issues to address in
determining the interrogation methods to be used on those detained.
On the one hand, any administration should have wanted to be able to
use interrogations methods that would elicit information to stop
attacks on the order of 9/11. On the other hand, any administration
should have been eager to show that the United States acted
humanely with respect to even egregious wrongdoers and in
particular followed the strictures of the Torture Convention. Restraint
and adherence to our own laws underscores the attractiveness of our
civilization in the global battle of ideas against radical Islam. This
American tradition goes back to the Revolutionary War when George
Washington insisted that the American army take prisoners even after
Hessians slaughtered his soldiers without quarter at Fort Washington.
That balance might have been best struck again by going to
Congress and seeking framework legislation. Congress should, and
would, have authorized the Administration to use harsh interrogation
methods short of torture in the circumstances where such methods
were necessary to get information to forestall attacks. A system
requiring personal and recorded authorization by a Cabinet official in
specific cases would provide substantial safeguards that these
methods would be used only selectively and where necessary. To be
sure, this authorization would have been a messy process and would
have publicized the Administration's methods, when secrecy could
itself have value by making it harder for the enemy to prepare for
questioning. But nothing on a matter as controversial as this is kept
secret long in Washington and when Congress set limits to the
Administration's interrogation process as it did in 2006 it was also a
messy process. The deliberation and consensus that Congress could
have provided earlier on would have educated the world to the
reasons that such interrogations were needed in the interest of the
safety not only of the United States but of other nations that were
threatened by the mass slaughter of modem terrorism.
But whether or not the Administration chose to go to Congress to
reinforce the legality of its interrogations methods, it could hardly
[VoL 25:2
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have chosen a worse strategy than it pursued. In a memo written to
Alberto Gonzales on August 1, 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel
provided a general interpretation of the the Torture Convention by
limiting the concept of torture to the infliction of physical pain
"equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury such as organ failure or impairment of bodily function."
39
According to the memo, the only psychological harm that amounted
to torture would be that leading to psychological harm "leading to
significant duration, e.g. lasting months or even years."'' Finally, the
memo concludes that the President has the constitutional authority to
set even those strictures aside if they impaired his ability to order
interrogations pursuant to his authority as commander in chief.
41
It is not my purpose here to dispute these conclusions as a legal
matter, but to show that whatever their correctness, the memo was
utterly counterproductive and should have been seen as such at the
time. Indeed, my strongest reaction as a former official at the Office
of Legal Counsel was not that of other observers who attacked the
legal analysis or even the morality of the memorandum. Instead, I
saw it as a bureaucratic blunder committed not so much by the
attorneys at OLC but by the White House Counsel and others in the
Administration who asked for this kind of analysis.
First, to anyone who has worked in the collaborative process of the
executive branch, it was clear that this memo would be leaked, and
leaked at the most inconvenient time to the Administration. One rule
I had at the Office of Legal Counsel was to consider how the
phrasing and framing of a memo I wrote would look on the first page
of the Washington Post. It would not take much imagination to see
that the abstract analysis and sweeping language in its statutory
analysis would allow opponents of the Administration to paint the
analysis as radical and unbounded. When its statutory analysis was
combined with the claim that the President has authority to disregard
the limitations of the Torture Convention whenever he thought this
39. See Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales from Jay Bybee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Re:
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was necessary as a commander in chief, it was easy to predict a
political firestorm that undermines support for harsh interrogation
tactics and more generally harmed the Administration's legal
credibility.
Assuming that the Administration chose not to obtain a framework
authorization statute for Congress, a far better way to achieve the
Administration's objectives would have been to catalogue the kind of
interrogation methods that the Administration actually wanted to use
and explain in some detail why those methods would not amount to
torture. This memo would have been a far more limited and less
controversial opinion, although some would still have disagreed with
its analysis. It could also have omitted the unnecessary claim that the
President could in some circumstances disregard the convention.
42
This sweeping claim seems to have been motivated by an interest in
restoring general executive branch authority. But it is fanciful to
believe that unilateral declarations by the Office of Legal Counsel,
known as the foremost defender of executive power, can accomplish
this goal. And by putting that expansion of executive power in the
context of harsh treatment of detainees, the memo set back the cause
which it was trying to promote.
IV. WAR CRIMES TRIALS
The Administration again had legitimate objectives in establishing
military tribunals to prosecute some of the detainees for war crimes.
It wanted to bring those who violated the laws of war to justice and
deter subsequent violations. But it did not want to use the Article III
court system and all its protection. To do so would have exposed
national security information in some cases. But more fundamentally,
our trial system would have taken a very long time and provided a
panoply of rights that are important to protect individual liberties
42. In fact, a subsequent memo from the Office of Legal Counsel revoking the 2002 memo expressly
stated that it was unnecessary to reach the issue of the President's constitutional authority. See
Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General From Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30,
2004).
[Vol. 25:2
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within civil society, but should not be extended to irregular
combatants whose activities lie outside the social compact. Swift
military justice is part of the necessary shock and awe against war
criminals.
But the Administration has succeeded in conducting only a very
few war crimes trials. One reason for the delays was that the
Administration's first set of rules for conducting the trials faced such
vigorous criticism that they were sent for revisions.43 And even after
revision many military lawyers within the Administration objected to
some of the provisions, creating a kind of bureaucratic inertia that
delayed indictments. But the most important reason for delay were
the war criminal defendants' successes in the lengthy constitutional
litigation over the procedures. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld the Court held
that some of the Administration's procedures violated the Uniform
Military Code of Justice as well as Article III of the Geneva
Convention which, according to the Court, Congress had made
applicable to military tribunals.
44
This signal defeat was quite possibly related to previous mistakes
in legal strategy. Strikingly, the Court gave no deference to the
Administration's interpretation of either the Uniform Military Code
of Justice or Article III of the Geneva Convention, despite precedent
for deferring to the executive's interpretation of treaties and statutes
governing the military.45 Whatever the doctrinal categories of
deference, the general credibility of executive branch positions will
hugely influence the actual degree of deference the Court applies.
This had been damaged by previous Administration legal analysis,
like that contained in the memo on interrogations, that the
Administration itself had since repudiated.
In Hamdan itself, Justice Breyer noted that "[n]othing prevents the
President from returning to Congress to seek the authorization he
believes necessary. ' '46 Of course, the President would not have had to
return to Congress and would not have faced substantial bureaucratic
43. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Alters Rules for War Crime Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at Al.
44. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624-26 (2006).
45. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1(1942).
46. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636.
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foot dragging had he sought congressional authorization for the
military tribunals in the first place. He almost certainly would have
gotten the procedures he desired, because even after the Supreme
Court defeat in Hamdan, he got most of the procedures he had sought
with some exceptions, including restrictions on the use of hearsay
and classified information.47 But the President was in a stronger
political position in 2003 and probably even in 2001 than at the end
of 2006.
V. SURVEILLANCE
The Bush Administration also had a choice about whether to obtain
express authorization to undertake surveillance of individuals in the
United States who were in contact with those in or near the
battlefields of terrorism. It decided to rely instead on the President's
authority as commander in chief and the general authority of the
statute that authorized the Administration to undertake military
actions against the terrorist organizations.
It was a mistake not to obtain express congressional authorization
for surveillance when it could have been easily been obtained.
Indeed, it may have run more substantial risks to rely on executive
authority in this regard than in the area of detentions and
interrogations for two reasons. First, Congress had already passed
framework legislation in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA") that regulated the authority of the executive to wiretap
individuals residing in the United States.48 That legislation by its
terms appears inconsistent with the authority exercised by the
Administration because it requires warrants which the Administration
has not sought. It appears to contemplate its applicability in time of
war, because it provided additional time to obtain such warrants in
wartime. Second, because this surveillance was being undertaken of
residents in the United States there was an even greater risk that
47. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
48. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
(Vol. 25:2
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 394 2008-2009
394   I    [  
 l  
 
r s    
,   t 
 ,       
4  r 
  
2  
v. IL  
ti   
 ti       
  t  
   t's 
 r    
  ti   
. 
   
    
i  
t     
ti s   
 i  ill ce  
    
l  48  
 t   
i   ti  
   
 l  
     
  
.  ilit r  i i  t f20 , . . . - ,  t t.  ( ). 
    . ,   
ed i    . . . . 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss2/5
LOSING THE LAW WAR
courts would not extend precedent to protect executive discretion in
this new kind of war.
The Bush Administration did finally seek congressional
authorization and on July 10, 2008, Congress amended FISA.49 But
by waiting the Bush Administration in this area as in others harmed
its reputation for fidelity to law and thus made the judiciary less
likely to trust it with discretion or rule in its favor in close cases.
CONCLUSION
The Bush Administration's legal strategy in the war on terror was
deeply flawed. Because of its interest in establishing powerful
precedent in favor of executive powers, it took bold positions that
carried substantial risks of judicial repudiation and failed to obtain
legislative endorsement at times of political opportunity. As a result,
the Supreme Court said on two occasions the President was acting
illegally, confirming an impression the President was a rogue
operator outside established law and popular opinion. The lesson for
future administrations seems clear. First, recognize that we live in a
time of much more activist courts even in the era of foreign affairs.
That fact may be bemoaned but it cannot be ignored and the reality of
their possible interventions must be factored into strategy from the
outset. Second, rely more on Congress than on courts, particularly
when the President enjoys support in the initial stages of the conflict
or his party controls Congress.
It is the executive's power to persuade from a position of strength
rather than formal legal powers that is the President's greatest asset.
But it is generally a wasting asset and thus the President should
translate it into more lasting legislative tools before its dissipation.
The President may have lost the war in Iraq because he did not call in
enough troops after the fall of Baghdad. He had substantial losses his
legal wars because he did not call on citizens through their
representatives to rally around a new, but carefully circumscribed,
49. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
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system of wartime detention and surveillance in a struggle whose
battlefields and duration have no clear limits.
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